Introducing new stories about the past and embedding them as part of the dominant historical narratives is not just a matter of uncovering new information. How the information is interpreted, how the story is told, and whether it captures people's imaginations, play an important part as do the ever-changing contours of popular memory. These factors can make the process of embedding new stories a gradual one. The Chinese protests against the various taxes imposed on them by the Victorian Government during the latter half of the 1850s are an example of this.

In 1982, Kathryn Cronin noted that the Chinese protests had 'received scant attention in Australian history books' - Geoffrey Serle's The golden age being the exception.² Since then, historians have attempted to address the imbalance.³ In this latest body of research there has been a trend towards identifying the influences that earlier miners' protests against the goldfields licence had on Chinese protest methods, particularly during 1859.⁴ This approach has the potential to facilitate new understandings by building on the familiar. Furthermore, by identifying how Chinese adopted Western constitutional forms of protest, this approach challenges cultural stereotypes that suggest Chinese were incapable of crossing cultural boundaries.

Despite these advances, other existing popular historical interpretations have the capacity to undermine the acceptance and appeal of this story. Elsewhere, I have indicated that the story of the Chinese protests conflicts with popular multicultural interpretations of democracy in the aftermath of the Eureka Rebellion, one of the protests against the goldfields licence.⁵ Other obstacles include the appeal of an instant success story, combined with a narrow perception of the measures of success.⁶ As Cronin explains, the Chinese protests 'had been the most determined, sustained diggers' resistance campaign'.⁷ The protests started in 1856, in response to legislation enacted in 1855, and continued into 1861; the various taxes imposed on the Chinese were removed in 1862 and 1863.⁸ This period of time makes it difficult to package the protests into an instant success story, especially when there is no direct correlation between the petitions and the immediate removal of the taxes. Valerie Lovejoy's research on the Bendigo Chinese protests in 1859 has attempted to overcome this obstacle. She suggests that sustained avoidance of the taxes after the 1859 petitions eventually led to the removal of the taxes.⁹

A better appreciation of the Chinese protests has the potential to evolve if we adopt the concept of a sustained resistance campaign starting from 1855, when the immigration poll tax was introduced. While earlier studies by Cronin and Serle reflect this approach, more recent studies have detracted from this understanding by predominantly focusing on one specific phase of the Chinese protests in 1859 (discussed below).

By adopting the concept of a sustained resistance campaign, we can begin to recognise how the Chinese successfully used tax evasion to render anti-Chinese legislation ineffective throughout the latter half of the 1850s. Had this not been the case, the Victorian Government would have had little reason to amend the legislation in 1857 and 1859 in an attempt to force the desired outcome: to discourage the Chinese from entering and settling in Victoria. In effect, this perspective encourages us to broaden our preconceptions of the measures of success beyond the immediate removal of the taxes and to recognise the importance of perseverance.

The concept of the protests being a sustained resistance campaign is also useful when examining the various petitions against anti-Chinese legislation. Besides demonstrating that the Chinese were capable of and willing to adopt Western forms of constitutional protest, the petitions are also examples of Chinese agency, evidence that the Chinese chose not to be passive victims. They provide valuable insights into the grounds upon which the Chinese defended their rights, and themselves, as well as understandings of the impact that anti-Chinese legislation was having on their lives. Documents presenting Chinese perspectives and those who supported them during this era of Chinese-Australian history are rare.

By placing the petitions in the context of evolving anti-Chinese legislation, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of the specific issues the Chinese were seeking to address during various phases of the protest campaign. Similarities and differences in argument between various Chinese groups can also be revealed when petitions from a particular phase are compared. Until now, most research on the petitions has focused on versions that were published in either newspapers or parliamentary papers. Original petitions located at Public Record Office Victoria (PROV) have been overlooked, possibly because of the challenges involved in locating these documents.¹⁰ Consequently, a number of the petitions have escaped the attention of historians.

This article seeks to build a more complete picture of the Chinese protests and to cultivate an appreciation of their sustained resistance campaign. It considers both published and unpublished petitions and examines them within the context of evolving anti-Chinese legislation during the latter half of the 1850s. In doing so, the article also identifies how the Victorian Government repeatedly amended anti-Chinese legislation and eventually removed these laws in response to Chinese evasion of taxes. The terms 'Chinese protests' and 'Chinese petitions' are used consistently throughout this article; however, it is evident that the Chinese were not alone in their fight. Elsewhere, I have started to discuss some of the motivations behind European support of the Chinese.¹¹ This article draws attention to this support; however, further detailed examination of the nature and extent of this involvement is beyond the scope of this particular paper.

The 1856 Chinese protests

On 12 June 1855, the Victorian Government introduced An Act for the Provision of Certain Immigrants in response to concerns about increasing numbers of Chinese arriving in the colony.¹² In 1853, the number of Chinese arrivals by sea had been a paltry 140; in 1854 this figure jumped to 4920. It more than doubled the following year to 11,493.¹³ Because they arrived in large numbers at a time when surface alluvial gold was becoming scarce, the Chinese were perceived by some as a cultural and economic threat. By June 1855 the Chinese population in the colony was estimated to be 17,000. Complete exclusion of the Chinese was not an option: this would have contravened the 1842 treaty resulting from the first Opium War between China and Britain and would have met with disapproval from the Colonial Office.¹⁴ Instead, the government agreed to control Chinese immigration by placing restrictions on the number of Chinese each vessel was permitted to carry (one Chinese passenger to every ten tons) and by introducing a £10 poll tax for each Chinese migrant to be paid on arrival. The legislation was harsher than the recommendation made by the Commission into Condition of the Goldfields (1854-1855), which was wary of further increases in Chinese immigration with the abolition of the goldfields licence.¹⁵ The Commission believed that restrictions on the number of Chinese passengers each vessel was permitted to carry (15-30 passengers or as many deemed necessary for a ship's crew) would be sufficient in dealing with the matter. Those who exceeded the restrictions were to be fined no less than £10.¹⁶